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Does worker mobility undermine governments￿ability to redistribute income? This
paper analyzes the experience of US states in the recent decades. We build a tractable
model where both migration decisions and redistribution policies are endogenous. We
calibrate the model to match skill premium and worker productivity at the state level,
as well as the size and skill composition of migration ￿ ows. The calibrated model
is able to reproduce the large changes in skill composition as well as key qualitative
relationships of labor ￿ ows and redistribution policies observed in the data. Our results
suggest that regional di⁄erences in labor productivity are an important determinant
of interstate migration. We use the calibrated model to compare the cross-section of
redistributive policies with and without worker mobility. The main result of the paper
is that interstate migration has induced substantial convergence in tax rates across
US states, but no race to the bottom. Skill-biased in-migration has reduced the skill
premium and the need for tax-based redistribution in the states that would have had
the highest tax rates in the absence of mobility.
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11 Introduction
Does worker mobility undermine governments￿ability to redistribute income? This paper
analyzes the experience of US states in the recent decades. We build a tractable model where
both migration decisions and redistribution policies are endogenous. Our calibrated model
reproduces the main qualitative features of net migration ￿ ows across US states.
The question of factor mobility and public policies dates back to Tiebout (1956) but
it is just as relevant nowadays. Nothing epitomizes this recurring debate better than the
European integration process. From the glacial pace of labor market integration to the now-
charismatic Polish plumber, some European politicians have argued that worker mobility is
a threat to progressive income taxation and to the welfare state.1
The US provides an excellent case study in worker mobility and redistribution policy. US
states are capable of dictating their redistribution policies and, indeed, there is substantial
variation in both tax levels and welfare bene￿ts across states (Meyer, 2000). In addition,
labor ￿ ows across US states are large and well documented (Coen-Pirani, 2006). Thus the
experience of the US is very informative regarding the determinants of redistribution policy
in an environment of high worker mobility.
We use a model where both labor ￿ ows and redistribution policy are endogenous.2A
de￿ning feature of our model is that policies must be credible, that is, they must meet the
redistributive demands of the ￿nal resident population.3 This way we rule out promises of
unrealistically low taxation, which no government would choose to validate once workers
have already incurred in the cost of moving. These non-credible promises are often at the
core of the ￿race to the bottom￿arguments. We emphasize that policy competition is still
present in our model, albeit curtailed, as workers decide whether and where to move by
comparing after-tax incomes.
In our framework migration decisions and redistribution policy are endogenous yet the
model remains tractable and adept for applied analysis. The three main features of our
framework are the following. First, we allow for region-speci￿c technology in order to capture
the large variation in worker productivity and skill wage premium across US states. Second,
we do not exogenously restrict the set of ￿scal instruments and, in particular, we do not rule
out progressive taxation. Finally, we allow for realistic worker mobility.
We calibrate the model to match state-level values of skill premium, output per worker,
1When the EU expanded in May 2004, twelve of the ￿fteen existing members imposed restrictions on
migrants from Eastern Europe. The impact of worker mobility was also prominently featured in the French
referendum on the EU constitution (see The Economist, A severe crise d￿ identitØ, 5/28,2005).
2This model is analyzed in detail in Armenter and Ortega (2007).
3Thus, our analysis is better suited to environments where migrants acquire political rights automatically.
Certainly, this is the case for interstate migrants in the US.
2and migration ￿ ows. The main data sources are the 2000 US Census and the Regional
Economic Accounts of the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Our ￿rst claim is that our model
can reproduce the main qualitative features of the data regarding the direction and skill
composition of net migration ￿ ows. First, labor productivity di⁄erences play a key role in
explaining labor ￿ ows. Second, the cross-state migration patterns of skilled and unskilled
workers are very similar; the large majority of states experienced either a net in￿ ow of both
skilled and unskilled workers, or a net out￿ ow of both types of workers. In addition, skilled
workers are highly over-represented among interstate migrants. The calibrated model is
also able to predict the large observed changes in state skill composition, the key driving
force behind income redistribution in our model. Finally, we capture some qualitative cross-
sectional relationships between redistributive policies and economic fundamentals.
We evaluate the impact of worker mobility on redistribution policies as follows. First,
we use our calibrated model to compute the policies that would have arisen in absence of
worker mobility. The resulting cross-section of policies is then compared to the equilibrium
with worker mobility.
We ￿nd that worker mobility has induced substantial convergence in tax rates, with no
downward pressure, among US states. In our calibrated model, the states that have expe-
rienced the largest worker in￿ ows are states with initially scarce skilled labor but relatively
high labor productivity. In autarky, these states would have displayed a high skill premium
and, consequently, would have taxed skilled workers heavily. The skill-biased nature of mi-
gration ￿ ows has reduced the skill premium and the need for tax-based redistribution in these
states. Despite lowering their tax rates, these states can a⁄ord the same level of transfers,
per recipient, thanks to the larger tax base.
1.1 Literature review
For several decades economists have been interested in tax competition among local/regional
governments when workers are geographically mobile. Initially, the main question was the
e¢ ciency properties of this decentralized allocation mechanism. In the context of local
public goods provision, Tiebout (1956) provides a setup where the allocation is e¢ cient.
A few decades later, Bewley (1981) formally restated Tiebout￿ s claim and argued that the
conditions to obtain e¢ ciency are quite strong.
Work in this area has continued over the last few decades. Wilson and Wildasin (2004)
provide a comprehensive review. In most of this work, often in the context of capital ￿ ows,
only one factor of production is allowed to move. Cremer and Pestieau (1998) analyze a
model with endogenous social security under two scenarios. In the ￿rst, only rich workers
can migrate while, in the second, only poor workers are mobile. Their results show that the
predictions of the model are very di⁄erent in the two cases.
3Lately there has been a surge in the study of the causes and consequences of internal
migration ￿ ows using US data. The strands of this literature more closely related to our
paper are the following.
A recent line of research in Macroeconomics studies internal migration ￿ ows. Building on
Blanchard and Katz (1992), Coen-Pirani (2006) describes the main facts on (gross) migration
￿ ows across US states during the postwar period, with an emphasis on the time series
properties. He builds a general equilibrium model with search, where net migration arises as
a result of local labor demand shocks. Two-way migration is due to idiosyncratic matches
at the individual level. His estimates show that the model is able to reproduce the main
features of the data. In particular, he ￿nds that net migration ￿ ows are strongly correlated
to di⁄erences in state-level average wages.
Using a similar framework, Lkhagvasuren (2005) studies di⁄erences in state-level unem-
ployment rates. In his analysis the emphasis is on the migration choices of unemployed
workers. Hassler et al (2005) also study the determinants of worker mobility in a model with
unemployment. However, they use a very di⁄erent approach, where unemployment bene￿ts
are endogenously determined. In their model, workers with lower geographical mobility vote
for high unemployment bene￿ts and their attachment to a region increases over time. This
mechanism gives rise to multiple equilibria and provides an explanation for observed di⁄er-
ences in worker mobility across countries. While in some cases bene￿ts are low, workers are
highly mobile, and unemployment rates are low, in others the opposite happens.
Recent work in Labor economics also studies internal migration. Kennan and Walker
(2006) estimate a multi-location search model using individual-level panel data from the
NLSY. Their analysis pays special attention to sequential migration choices, including return
migration. Their results clearly show that workers relocate (across US states) in response to
poor individual income realizations. Their analysis is restricted to workers with a high-school
degree that did not attend college.
Dahl (2002) estimates a multi-location model of one-time migration. He argues that
available estimates of returns to education at the state-level are likely to be biased due
to self-selection along unobserved individual characteristics. He builds a Roy model with
multiple locations and estimates it using data from the 1990 US Census. In his analysis,
a migrant is de￿ned as an individual that resides (in 1990) in a state di⁄erent from his or
her state of birth. He provides estimates of the 51 by 51 transition matrices from each US
state to each other state, disaggregated by education levels. His results con￿rm that skilled
workers are more mobile, that bilateral in-migration ￿ ows are more skill-biased in states with
higher skill premium, and that amenities are important determinants of migration. He also
￿nds that self-selection introduces an upward bias in OLS estimates of state-level returns
to education. Corrected estimates still display a large cross-sectional variation in returns to
education.
4Bayer and Jussen (2006) estimate the monetary cost of migration across US states in
the context of a dynamic model that explicitly accounts for self-selection. They estimate
the model using state-level data on interstate migration provided by the Internal Revenue
Service. They ￿nd that the cost of migration is about twice the average annual household
income, substantially lower than previous estimates.
Also with a labor economics focus, Meyer (2000) studies the e⁄ect of di⁄erences in welfare
bene￿ts at the state-level on migration, the so-called welfare migration. He uses US Census
data for 1980 and 1990, and de￿nes a migrant as an individual that changed state of residence
within the last ￿ve years. His measure of bene￿ts is the sum of two programs: Aid for Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Food Stamps, adjusted for housing costs (rent plus
utilities). His estimates suggest that welfare migration exists but it is small.
A third line of research aims at explaining the large di⁄erences in the concentration
of college-educated workers across US states. Bound et al (2004) examine whether states
with more colleges and universities have larger numbers of college-graduate residents. Their
analysis combines Census data with surveys conducted by the Department of Education.
Their ￿ndings suggest that no relationship between the production and the stock of educated
workers in a state. In other words, college-educated workers seem to be highly geographically
mobile.
Hendricks (2004) is another attempt to explain state di⁄erences in skill composition.
His paper has three parts. First, using Census data, he shows that states where educated
workers are more abundant are specialized in skill-intensive sectors and use skilled workers
more intensively across all industries. However, skill premia are not lower in these states.
Next, he presents a simple model where skilled workers are perfectly mobile and states di⁄er
in the relative demand for skilled labor. He then argues that the calibrated model can
account for 90% of the di⁄erences in skill composition across US states. The third part
of the paper presents a model of human capital agglomeration economies where technology
di⁄erences at the state level arise endogenously.
Glaeser and Saiz (2003) also examine the connection between human capital and pro-
ductivity at the local level. Speci￿cally, they study the determinants of city growth in the
US in the last few decades. Their main ￿nding is that the fraction of skilled workers in a
city (or metropolitan area) is a strong predictor of population growth. This relationship is
present only among declining cities, suggesting that skills are crucial in the ability of a city
to adapt to a negative idiosyncratic productivity shock.
52 Set Up
We consider a world economy consisting of R = f1;2;:::;Rg regions. In each region r 2 R,
there are two types of workers: unskilled and skilled, denoted by subscripts i = 1 and i = 2,
respectively. Each region r starts with a measure er
i > 0 of workers of each type. After all
migration decisions have been made, the measure of workers of type i in region r is denoted
nr
i.
De￿nition 1 A world distribution of workers n = fnr
1;nr











for i = 1;2 and nr
i ￿ 0 for all r 2 R, i = 1;2.




2) denote an allocation for region r where cr
i
and lr
i denote consumption and hours worked by an agent of type i in region r. We let
x = fxrgr2R be a world allocation. We assume that the preferences of workers of both types
are represented by a separable utility function U(ci;li) = u(ci) ￿ v (li), with u0 > 0, u00 < 0,
v0 > 0 and v00 > 0. To save on notation we shall often write U (xr





Unskilled and skilled labor are di⁄erentiated inputs in the production process. We as-
sume that unskilled workers can only supply unskilled labor as they are not quali￿ed to
perform certain tasks. Skilled workers, though, can supply either skilled or unskilled labor.
Throughout the paper, we restrict our attention to economies where skilled labor is the
scarce factor.





We assume production function F r is di⁄erentiable, constant returns to scale, strictly con-
cave, and satis￿es F r
12 > 0 as well as the appropriate Inada conditions.
In order to be precise about what we mean by ￿scarce,￿let ￿r = nr
2=nr
1 be the ratio of








For commonly used production functions, there exists a unique value of ￿ ￿r.4 Skilled labor is
scarce in region r as long as ￿r < ￿ ￿r, which we assume for all regions from now on.
We are now set to de￿ne feasible allocations.
4We need Fr
2 (1;0) > Fr
1 (0;1) and Fr
2 (1;￿) < Fr
1 (1;￿) for some ￿ > 0.





















and hours worked and consumption are non-negative, for all r 2 R.
3 Redistribution Policy
Redistribution policy in our model is decided by a regional ￿scal authority which looks after
the welfare of its residents. We start then by studying the problem of optimal redistribution
policy for a given workforce (n1;n2). For notational convenience, we drop the superscripts
indexing each region.
We do not exogenously restrict the tax instruments available to the ￿scal authority. In
particular, we allow for non-linear tax schedules and hence progressive income taxation. We
assume, though, that workers￿types are unobservable so the tax schedule can only be a
function of the workers￿actions. This restricts the set of redistribution policies. Since skilled
workers can perform unskilled tasks, a very aggressive redistribution policy would lead skilled
workers to pass o⁄ as unskilled.
We proceed as follows. First, we state the optimal redistribution policy problem as a
classic Mirrlees (1971) direct taxation problem. The Mirrlees approach reduces the problem
to choosing feasible allocations subject to a set of incentive compatibility constraints. These
constraints ensure that all workers truthfully reveal their type. Second, we show that we
can decentralize the resulting allocation as a competitive equilibrium with a lump sum tax
on skilled workers￿ its precise level given by the incentive compatibility constraint. Finally
we describe the key properties of the allocation.
In our economy only skilled workers can mislead the government by supplying unskilled
labor. Thus the only incentive compatibility constraint states that a skilled worker is no
worse o⁄ than an unskilled worker.
De￿nition 3 Feasible allocation x = (c1;l1;c2;l2) is incentive compatible if
U (c1;l1) ￿ U (c2;l2):
The optimal redistribution policy problem is then to pick the incentive compatible allo-
cation which provides the highest social welfare given the current workforce (n1;n2).5 We
label the resulting allocation as second best.
5Note that the workforce includes not only "native" workers but also migrants from other regions that
are now living in the region.
7De￿nition 4 An allocation x is second best given (n1;n2) if it solves
maxn1U (c1;l1) + n2U (c2;l2)
subject to
U (c1;l1) ￿ U (c2;l2);
n1c1 + n2c2 ￿ F (n1l1;n2l2);
and non-negativity constraints for consumption and hours worked.
We can re-write the second best problem in terms of the ratio of skilled to unskilled
workers ￿ = n2=n1. Constant returns to scale imply that F (n1l1;n2l2) = n1F (l1;￿l2) and
therefore second best allocations also solve
maxU (c1;l1) + ￿U (c2;l2) (SBP)
subject to
c1 + ￿c2 ￿ F (l1;￿l2) (RC)
U (c1;l1) ￿ U (c2;l2) (IC)
and non-negativity constraints.
The characterization of second best allocations is not di¢ cult. Policy models with linear
tax rates are often hindered by implementability constraints shaping non-convex choice sets.
In contrast, we can assert the necessity and su¢ ciency of the ￿rst order conditions associated
with the problem. The next result states that second best allocations can be decentralized
in terms of a lump sum tax on skilled workers.
Proposition 5 Let x be a second best allocation given ￿: Then there exists a lump sum
tax ￿ and wage rates (w1;w2) such that allocation x can be decentralized as a competitive
equilibrium:
1. Pair (c1;l1) solves the problem of unskilled households:
maxU (c1;l1) s.t. c1 ￿ w1l1 + ￿￿;
with c1 ￿ 0, l1 ￿ 0.
2. Pair (c2;l2) solves the problem of skilled households:
maxU (c2;l2) s.t. c2 ￿ w2l2 ￿ ￿;
with c2 ￿ 0, l2 ￿ 0.
83. Wages equal marginal products:
w1 = F1 (l1;￿l2)
w2 = F2 (l1;￿l2):
Proof. In the Appendix
Hence second best allocations can be implemented with a very simple, non distortionary
tax system. The precise value of the lump sum tax ￿ is a function of the skill ratio as well
as the production technology.
We collect below the key properties of second best allocations.
Proposition 6 Let x be a second best allocation given ￿,
1. The incentive compatibility constraint (IC) is binding:
U(c1;l1) = U(c2;l2):
2. There is a strictly positive skill premium:
w1 < w2:
3. Skilled workers consume more, c2 > c1; and supply more labor, l2 > l1; than unskilled
workers.
4. The tax is strictly positive: ￿ > 0.
Proof. In the Appendix
It is clear that the ￿scal authority would like to redistribute income from skilled to
unskilled workers more aggressively. In the second-best allocation, consumption and wages
are higher for skilled workers. However, the need to provide the right incentives to skilled
workers limits the amount of redistribution. As a result, second-best allocations are fully
characterized by the binding incentive and resource constraints, together with the equality
of marginal rates of substitution to marginal products of labor for both types.
We ￿nish this section with an important result. Consider an in￿ ow of skilled workers
into a region. In a laissez-faire economy, a larger ratio of skilled workers makes unskilled
workers better o⁄ and skilled workers worse o⁄. However, this is not true for second best
allocations: both types of workers are strictly better o⁄ with a higher skill ratio. The higher
skill premium leads to a lower skill premium and a lower lump sum tax.
9Proposition 7 Let ￿ < ￿0 < ￿ ￿ and let x and x0 be second best allocations under ￿ and ￿0;
respectively. Then U (c2;l2) < U (c0
2;l0
2) and U (c1;l1) < U (c0
1;l0
1). Moreover, second best




Proof. In the Appendix
The mechanics behind the result are simple. The incentive compatibility constraint is
binding for all ￿ < ￿ ￿. It is not possible that the welfare of unskilled workers increases
with ￿ without a parallel increase in the welfare of skilled workers. Otherwise the incentive
compatibility would be violated. Intuitively, the increase in the relative supply of skilled
labor reduces the skilled wage (and increases the unskilled wage). Thus skilled workers need
to be compensated with a tax cut to prevent them from taking unskilled jobs.
4 Labor Mobility and Credible Policy Equilibrium
This section de￿nes an equilibrium with endogenous migration and redistribution. We start
by describing migration decisions. Each worker in each region r receives one opportunity
to move, (r0;m), specifying a destination region r0 6= r and a migration cost m in terms of
utility. Each region generates migration opportunities equally, that is, a fraction 1=(R ￿ 1)
of workers born in region r receive opportunities to migrate to each other region r0. Hence,





for i = 1;2.
Migration cost m is idiosyncratic, drawn from a distribution with c.d.f. Di (m) for i = 1;2
with D0
i (m) > 0 for all m ￿ 0. We allow the distribution to be worker-type speci￿c. The
equilibrium condition requires that if a worker born in region r with migration opportunity
(r0; ￿ m) chooses to migrate, all workers with opportunities (r0;m) with lower migration costs,
m ￿ ￿ m, will migrate as well.
Let ￿i(r;r0) be the fraction of workers of type i = 1;2 moving from r to r0. The whole
matrices of (gross) migration ￿ ows from one region to the others can then be summarized
by functions ￿i : R2 ! [0;1] for i = 1;2. We will let ￿i (r;r) = 0.
Given migration ￿ ows ￿i and worker type i = 1;2, the native workforce that remains in







































for i = 1;2.
It will be useful to de￿ne the mobility cost incurred by marginal migrants. For each pair
of regions (r;r0), we can de￿ne the highest mobility cost paid by a migrant as follows. Given






We note that ￿i (x) is unbounded as x ! 1. Moreover, ￿i (x) is di⁄erentiable, for x > 0, and
￿0
i (x) > 0.
Before proceeding further, we de￿ne a world equilibrium for any given set of feasible
policies f￿rgr2R. Recall from the previous section that second best allocations can be de-
centralized with lump sum taxes.
De￿nition 8 A world equilibrium given policies f￿rgr2R is a world allocation, a pattern of




1. For every r 2 R, xr is a competitive equilibrium given ￿r and fnr
1;nr
2g,
2. The worker distribution is feasible and satis￿es (1).
3. For each r 2 R, all individually pro￿table moves from r to r0 have taken place, that is,
U(x
r0




with equality if ￿i(r;r0) > 0, for all r0 6= r and i = 1;2.
We have already discussed Condition 2. Condition 3 states the optimality of the migration
decisions. Migration takes place from region r to r0 until the marginal migrant is indi⁄erent.
Migration (from r to r0) does not take place at all if it is not pro￿table for the potential
11migrant with zero mobility costs: U(xr0
i ) ￿ U(xr
i) < 0. Note that each individual migrant
takes policies (allocations) as given.
Next we de￿ne our concept of policy equilibrium. We view the ￿nal workforce composition
as the key determinant of redistribution policy. As a result, our policy equilibrium requires
allocations to be second best given the distribution of workers.
It is useful to visualize our equilibrium concept as a sequential game. First, workers
decide where to go; then each region decides its policy. The requirement that allocations
are second best is akin to subgame perfection, which rules out non-credible redistribution
promises. Regions still engage in tax competition to attract skilled workers. However, their
policy announcements are restricted by their technology and labor endowments.
De￿nition 9 A credible policy equilibrium is a world equilibrium such that for every r 2 R
allocation xr is second best given fnr
1;nr
2g.
Here we describe some features of equilibrium migration ￿ ows. We shall come back to
them later on, when we introduce the data on migration ￿ ows.
First, migration ￿ ows are one-way. If in equilibrium any workers migrate from region r
to region r￿ , it cannot be the case that workers from region r￿are moving to region r. This
is because mobility costs are positive. This observation makes clear that ours is a theory of
net migration.6
Secondly, in equilibrium both types of workers move in the same direction. Speci￿cally,
if unskilled workers are migrating from region r to region r0, then skilled workers are doing
likewise. This result follows from the fact that, in equilibrium, the utility of both types of
workers is equated in each region.
The previous remarks imply that each region will su⁄er out￿ ows of workers toward all
other regions with higher equilibrium utility. Ranking states in increasing equilibrium util-
ities, the equilibrium migration matrices, for both types of workers, will only have positive
entries above the main diagonal.
A direct implication of the last remark is that equilibrium total migration rates out of a
region are decreasing in the level of utility of each region. Speci￿cally, given migration rates






We collect these results into one proposition that needs no proof.
6Coen-Pirani (2006) and Lkhagvasuren (2005) study models with matching frictions that give rise to
two-way migration.
12Proposition 10 Let ￿ and x be part of a credible policy equilibrium. Relabel regions in
increasing equilibrium utility. Then




for i = 1;2.
2. Both skilled and unskilled move in the same direction: ￿1 (r;r0) > 0 if and only if
￿2 (r;r0) > 0.
3. Bilateral net out￿ ow ￿i (r;r0) ￿ 0 if and only if r < r0.
4. Total out-migration rates are weakly decreasing: ￿i (r) ￿ ￿i (r0) for r < r0.
5 Calibration
We now use our model to study the determination of migration ￿ ows and redistribution
policies in US states.7 First, we calibrate the model to capture the large heterogeneity
among US states in terms of technology and labor endowments. These di⁄erences will play
a key role for the main results of the paper.
5.1 Functional Forms
We assume that each state￿ s aggregate production function belongs to the CES family:
F






where ￿r > 0; 0 < ￿r < 1, and ￿ ￿ 1.8 It is worth pointing out that the labor productivity
parameter, ￿r, captures not only possible regional technology di⁄erences but also di⁄erences
in any factors of production other than labor. Additionally, regional di⁄erences in industrial
composition may also lead to di⁄erences in aggregate production functions at the state level.
We assume the utility function is logarithmic,
U(c;l) = ln(c) + ln(1 ￿ l):
7We focus on 50 states, after discarding the District of Columbia because of its special status and its high
level of integration with the surrounding states.
8The elasticity of substitution is given by ￿ = 1=(1 ￿ ￿).
13Finally, we assume that idiosyncratic mobility costs are drawn from Pareto distributions:
m ￿ D(mjkj) = 1 ￿ (1 + m)
￿kj,
where m ￿ 0, and kj > 0. We note that higher values of kj imply higher mobility (lower
mobility costs).
5.2 Parameter values
There are two sets of parameters of interest: the ones describing the state-speci￿c aggregate
production functions and those characterizing the mobility cost distributions. The latter will
be discussed in the next section, when we introduce the data on interstate migration.
Our calibration of production functions follows closely Hendricks (2004).9 In principle,
there are 101 parameters: a pair (￿r;￿r) for each state and a common value of ￿. Ciccone and
Peri (2004) use data on skill premium di⁄erences across US states to estimate the elasticity
of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor. Based on their results, we set ￿ = 0:4,
implying an elasticity of substitution of 1:67. The remaining parameters are chosen to match
the values in the data for skill premium and output per worker in each state.
More speci￿cally, for each state, we solve for the allocation and the two technology pa-



































r denote, respectively, the values in the data for the skilled-to-unskilled
ratio, worker productivity and the skill premium in region r.10
Let us now brie￿ y describe these data. The appendix contains a comprehensive descrip-
tion of the sample and the variable de￿nitions. Our measure of worker productivity is state
GDP divided by the employment in year 2000. According to our calculations, average worker
productivity was $56,430. The top 5 states were Delaware, Connecticut, New York, New
9He calibrated state-speci￿c CES production functions for US states (and for metropolitan areas), using
data up to 1990.
10The other four conditions are the equality between MRS and marginal product for each type of worker,
and the binding resource and incentive constraints.
14Jersey, and Massachusetts, with an average of $77,500. At the other end, the bottom 5
states were Vermont, Oklahoma, Mississippi, North Dakota, and Montana, with an average
of $43,600. Figure 1 summarizes the data. Naturally, there is a positive correlation between
the fraction of skilled workers in a state￿ s workforce and its output per worker.
To estimate state-level skill composition and skill premium we use data from the US
Census 2000. Our sample contains only individuals age 25-45; old enough to have completed
college but young enough so that migration is not driven by retirement considerations. We
consider individuals with a completed college degree as skilled. All the rest are classi￿ed
as unskilled. We take the fraction of skilled workers residing in each state in year 2000
as a measure of the relative supply of skilled workers in the state.11 In our sample, the
skill fraction ranges from 0.17 to 0.38, with an average value of 0.26. The top 5 states by
skill fraction were Maryland, Colorado, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Massachusetts. The
bottom 5 were West Virginia, Nevada, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Kentucky. Table 1 reports
the values for each state.
Our measure of skill premium is the ratio of hourly wages for college graduates (skilled)
and workers without a college degree (unskilled). For the sake of comparability, we esti-
mate state-speci￿c wages using a sub-sample of individuals with comparable demographics,
described in detail in the appendix. Figure 2 summarizes the results. The average skill pre-
mium in our sample is 1.66. The 5 states with the highest skill premium were Connecticut,
Virginia, New York, Arkansas, and Georgia, with an average of 1.86. The bottom 5 states
were Alaska, Montana, North Dakota, Wisconsin, and Hawaii, with an average of 1.43.
Using these data, we solve the previous (non-linear) system of equations for each of the 50
states considered. We ￿nd substantial heterogeneity in the technology parameters across US
states. On average, the skill-bias parameter (￿) takes a value of 0:50, ranging from 0:40 to
0:61. This parameter can be interpreted as a measure of the relative demand for skilled labor
in the state and, together with the relative supply, determines the skill premium. Di⁄erences
in the skill-bias parameter may re￿ ect state di⁄erences in sectoral composition. We ￿nd a
strong correlation (0.86) between the relative supply of skilled workers and the skill-bias
parameter across US states, suggesting that states with relatively high demand for skilled
labor also have a relatively high supply of it. As a result, there is no systematic relationship
between skill bias (relative demand for skilled labor) and skill premium.12 Figure 3 in the
appendix illustrates this point.
Turning to the labor productivity parameter (￿), we ￿nd an average value of 2.72 and
tremendous variation across states, ranging from 1.86 to 4.31. In our results states with a
11We note that both US-born and foreign-born residents are part of the labor force.
12This result con￿rms the ￿ndings in Hendricks (2004). Our calibration uses more recent data and we
allow for di⁄erences both in skill bias and in labor productivity.




Following Aghion et al (2005) and Dahl (2002), we de￿ne a migrant as a worker that resides
(in year 2000) in a state di⁄erent from his state of birth. We can summarize the relevant
migration data using transition matrices M1 and M2. The typical element in these matrices,
Mi(r;s), reports the number of individuals of skill type i that were born in state r and live
in state s in year 2000. We can now de￿ne net migration matrices Ni = Mi ￿M0
i, where the
typical element
Ni(r;s) = Mi(r;s) ￿ Mi(s;r)
is the net out-migration from state r to state s, for workers of skill type i = 1;2. Using these







that is, by adding over all possible destinations including the state of origin.14 Similarly, we







for i = 1;2, where we are now adding over all regions of origin.


























13The correlation coe¢ cient is 0.52.
14The d superscript stands for data.
16By de￿ning migrants in reference to their state of birth, we are leaving foreign-born
workers out of the analysis. This omission could be potentially important, given the size of
the foreign-born group and its highly uneven distribution across US states. We show below
that this is not the case. We back up this claim by carrying out the analysis using also an
alternative approach to characterize interstate migration that includes foreign-born workers.
We assume that states were endowed with equal numbers of foreign-born workers and take
their state of residence from the data. In this manner, foreign-born workers are treated
symmetrically to US-born ones.15 Speci￿cally, we modify the previous de￿nitions of labor











where fi(r) is the number of foreign-born workers, of skill type i, living in region r, and fi is
the corresponding average across all states. Skill fractions ~ ￿d
e(r) and ~ ￿d
n(r), and skill fraction
gain f SG
d
(r) are de￿ned analogously.16 Let us now turn to the data.
6.2 State-level skill distributions
Let us begin by examining the cross-section of labor endowments and, in particular, the
fraction of skilled workers by state of birth. Figure 5 illustrates the large dispersion in skill
composition across states. The average fraction of skilled workers across US states is 0.26,
ranging from 0.19 to 0.36. The three states with lowest values are Kentucky, West Virginia,
and Arkansas, while the three with highest skill fractions are New York, Connecticut, and
Massachusetts. Including the foreign-born population reduces slightly the dispersion.17
Next, let us turn to the cross-section of skilled workers in the workforce, namely, when
we sort individuals by state of residence in year 2000. Figure 6 reports the results. We note
that the dispersion is larger than in ￿gure 1, with values ranging from 0.17 to 0.38.
Finally, let us examine the skill fraction gain implied by the data, as de￿ned in expression
(4). As shown in ￿gure 7, interstate migration has had a large e⁄ect on skill composition at
the state level: some states have gained 6 percentage points, while others have lost likewise.18
15In the US, naturalization usually takes 10 years. Given the long time period implicit in our approach,
it seems sensible to treat US-born and foreign-born workers equally.
16Which of the two approaches is more correct depends on the interplay between the migration decisions
of native and foreign-born workers. For references on whether immigrants geographically displace natives
see Borjas et al (1997) and Card and DiNardo (2000).
17The average fraction of college educated is roughly similar among foreign-born and US-born individuals.
18Including the data on foreign-born workers has little e⁄ect on the skill fraction gains. The correlation
coe¢ cient between the values implied by the two approaches is 0.88.
17We show in the next section that our calibrated model can account for the large changes in
skill composition at the state level.
7 Model evaluation
The purpose of this section is to evaluate the performance of the calibrated model in pre-
dicting the cross-sections of redistributive policies and net migration ￿ ows.
It is important to keep in mind that the main use of the model will be to measure the
impact of interstate migration on state-level redistribution. The credibility of that exercise
crucially depends on the ability of the model to explain the observed changes in the fraction
of skilled workers at the state level. We shall pay special attention to this aspect of migration
￿ ows. We anticipate that the model captures relatively well the main qualitative features of
the data regarding redistributive policies and net migration.
7.1 Cross-section utility levels
Let us begin by computing the cross-section of equilibrium utility levels. This is the key
input to generate equilibrium bilateral migration ￿ ows.
We compute equilibrium utilities in the following manner.19 For each state, we compute
the second-best allocation, using the technology parameters obtained in the previous section
and the skill composition observed in the data.20 Table 2 reports the ranking of states
by equilibrium utility. Montana, North Dakota, and Mississippi are the states with lowest
utility. At the other extreme, New York, Connecticut, and Delaware are the three states
with the highest utility.
Recall that states di⁄er in technology and in labor endowments. Theoretically, di⁄erences
in utility could arise from di⁄erences in either of these; both more skilled labor endowments
and higher labor productivity imply higher levels of utility. However, in practice, labor
productivity di⁄erences are the key variable. The simple correlation coe¢ cient between the
vector of utilities and the vector of labor productivity is 0:98.21
For the remainder of the paper it will be helpful to order states in increasing level of
utility. For instance, Montana is indexed by 1 and Delaware by 50.
19Recall that in equilibrium all workers residing in a given state enjoy the same level of utility.
20Here we are implicitly assuming that the geographical distribution of workers over regions of residence
in the data coincides with the one implied by the equilibrium. Later in this section we show that this is not
a bad approximation. The appendix presents an extension of the model that allows for a perfect match.
21A quick look at ￿gure 1 reveals the strong similarity between the distributions by worker productivity
and by equilibrium utility.
187.2 Implications for migration ￿ ows
Let us start by examining the performance of the model in predicting interstate migration
￿ ows. We focus on three important features that were spelled out in section 4.22
7.2.1 Direction of net ￿ ows
The model predicts that, in net terms, both types of workers go in the same direction. In
other words, in equilibrium, a region that receives a net in￿ ow of skilled workers from another
region will also receive a net in￿ ow of unskilled workers from that region. In terms of the
net out-migration matrices in the data,
N1(r;s) > 0 if and only if N2(r;s) > 0,
for all pairs of states (r;s).
Let us now examine whether this holds in the data. Given that we consider R = 50
regions, the total number of (unordered) pairs of states is R(R ￿ 1)=2 = 1;225.
We ￿nd that in 83% of the cases net out-migration for both types of workers went in the






Most states fall in the top-right or bottom-left quadrants of the ￿gure and deviations from
this pattern are quantitatively very small. In our view, this ￿nding is quite revealing. It
strongly suggests that the internal migration decisions of skilled and unskilled workers are
strongly aligned. In particular, relative skill scarcity seems to play no role at all.
7.2.2 Total out-migration rates
As discussed in the theory sections, the model implies that total out-migration rates, ￿i(r),
are decreasing functions of the state￿ s utility rank, for both types of workers. That is, states
with a lower rank (utility) should display the largest net out￿ ow rates for both types of
workers. Let us examine whether this implication of the model is borne by the data.
We choose to focus on total migration ￿ ows into a state from all other states. The reason
is that total ￿ ows are a su¢ cient statistic for changes in a region￿ s skill distribution. This is
our object of interest since it is the channel through which migration a⁄ects redistribution
22We shall focus on the subsample of individuals born in the US. In this manner our results do not depend
on how we allocate foreign-born workers to the labor endowments of each state. The previous section showed
that the main features of the data are robust to the inclusion of foreign-born workers.
19in our model. At any rate, the appendix contains an extension of the model that allows for
a quantitative match of the data on bilateral ￿ ows.
Gross out-migration rates We view our model as a theory of net migration but it is
instructive to look ￿rst at gross rates. Speci￿cally, we use our data to build the total out-












for skill type i = 1;2.
Figure 10 summarizes the relationship between states￿equilibrium utility and total out-
migration rates. In the ￿gure, we have classi￿ed the 50 states by deciles of equilibrium utility.
That is, decile 1 contains the 5 states with lowest utility and decile 10 the 5 states with the
highest utility.23 The ￿gure plots the mean values for each decile.
Two features stand out from ￿gure 10. First, the out-migration probabilities of skilled
workers are substantially higher than those for unskilled workers. The average out-migration
probability for skilled workers is 0.53, 47% higher than for the unskilled (0.37). Next, we
note the generally decreasing pattern of the out-migration probabilities as a function of
equilibrium utility. As predicted by the model, states with lower equilibrium utility su⁄ered
very large out￿ ows of workers of both types, with skilled workers displaying the largest total
(gross) out-migration rates. It is also worth noting that the states in the top 2 utility deciles
display rather large out￿ ows. We come back to this point below.
Overall, our model reproduces qualitatively the decreasing pattern of total out-migration
rates as a function of equilibrium utility. In quantitative terms, we note that while the model
predicts zero out-migration probabilities for the state with the highest utility, this is not true
in the data.
Let us now use these data on out-migration probabilities to calibrate the parameters of
the migration cost distributions. First, let us note that equilibrium total out-migration rates











for i = 1;2, where U￿
r denotes the equilibrium utility in region r. As noted earlier, higher
values of Pareto parameter ki imply higher out-migration rates. As shown in ￿gure 10, the
23Table 2 reports the ranking of states by equilibrium utility.






Given data on the vector of equilibrium utilities (and the fact that R = 50), we solve for the
values of the Pareto parameters.24 We ￿nd
(k1;k2) = (2:04;3:54):
Net out-migration rates Let us start by constructing total net out-migration rates, for













where we are making use of expressions (2) and (3).
Figure 11 plots these variables as a function of state equilibrium utility. Again, we group
states by utility deciles. States in lower utility deciles su⁄ered net out￿ ows of both types of
workers. Most states in higher utility deciles experienced net in￿ ows of both types. Decile
10 (Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, and Delaware) is an exception.
The states in this decile experienced (small) net out￿ ows of both types of workers even
though, according to the model, they should have attracted large net ￿ ows from other regions.
Clearly, some determinants of net migration ￿ ows are still missing in our model.25
Importantly, ￿gure 11 also shows that net migration ￿ ows are skill-biased, as was the case
for gross ￿ ows. That is to say, for the states su⁄ering net out-￿ ows, net out-migration rates of
skilled workers are higher than for unskilled workers. Instead, for states experiencing net in-
￿ ows, net out-migration rates of skilled workers were lower, that is, higher net in-migration
rates.
7.2.3 Changes in skill composition
We have just seen that two important implications of the model regarding interstate migra-
tion are qualitatively borne by the data: net migration ￿ ows of both types of workers go
in the same direction and net out-migration rates are generally decreasing in equilibrium
utility, for both types of workers.
24By focusing on the ￿rst decile we use data on all destination states.
25The surprisingly low number for decile 7 is due to the huge in￿ ows of workers, relative to its size,
experienced by Nevada. When this state is dropped from the decile, the mean values become -0.06 for
unskilled and -0.09 for skilled.
21We now turn to the performance of the model in predicting changes in the skill com-
position at the state level, the key dimension for the purposes of the next section. In our
model, changes in redistributive tax ￿ re￿ ect the e⁄ect of migration on the region￿ s skill
distribution. In particular, a region that su⁄ers a reduction in its fraction of skilled workers
will raise ￿ in response to the larger skill premium. Conversely, regions that end up with
a higher fraction of skilled workers will see a lower skill premium and a reduced need for
tax-based redistribution.
Figure 12a reports the actual skill fraction gain and the one predicted by the model.
The model predicts remarkably well the changes in skill composition. Note that the actual
skill fraction gain is, roughly, an increasing function of equilibrium utility. According to the
model, this is due to the combination of two facts. First, states with higher equilibrium
utility experience a larger net in￿ ow of workers (of both types). Second, migration is skill-
biased, that is, skilled workers are more mobile than unskilled ones. As a result, higher
utility deciles experience larger gains in skill fraction. We also point out that the top decile
clearly deviates from this pattern but, surprisingly, the model is able to capture this fact.26
Figure 12b shows that the results are virtually unchanged if we include the foreign-born in
the data.
The success of the model in predicting the changes in skill composition is just a re￿ ection
of successfully predicting the cross-section of the fractions of skilled workers that reside in
each state. Figure 13 illustrates this point.
Finally, we point out that regional di⁄erences in labor productivity are the key driving
force behind net migration ￿ ows in our model. In other words, we could have predicted state
gains in skill fraction using exclusively the cross-section of labor productivities (￿).
7.3 Implications for redistributive policies
We now compute the equilibrium level of redistribution in each region and compare the
resulting cross-section to the one in the data. We examine implications both in terms of
taxes and redistributive transfers.
7.3.1 Taxes
In our stylized economy, income redistribution is carried out using a simple income tax
schedule. But, in reality, many taxes can be used to ￿nance redistributive transfers. For this
26A closer look at the data reveals that the states in the top decile have su⁄ered net out￿ ows and, as a
result, they have experienced a loss in their skill fraction. In the model these states have experienced large
net in￿ ows of workers. However, the skill fraction of the in￿ ows would have been lower than the skill fraction
among the state-born workers, resulting in a lower skill fraction.
22reason we believe that the most appropriate empirical counterpart of the tax in the model
is the total tax revenue collected in a state (using several tax instruments) as a fraction of
state income.
Let us now turn to the data. We consider two measures of tax revenue for 2000. The ￿rst
is total personal current taxes (federal, state, and local) over state income. This is mainly
income taxes. The second is state (and local) personal current taxes plus property tax, also
over state income. We also look at income tax rates as follows. We compute the tax that
a typical skilled family would have to pay in each of the US states, as a fraction of their
pre-tax income.27 More details are provided in the appendix.
Table 3 collects summary statistics. On average, total personal taxes are 13.26% of state
income. Di⁄erences across states are quite large, ranging from 9.84% to 19.23%. With respect
to income tax rates (on skilled households), the average is 0.27, and ranges between 0.23 and
0.30. We note that explaining the data along this dimension is quite a challenging task given
that some states have a zero (state) income tax rate, despite being highly heterogeneous in
their economic primitives.28
We can compute the analog measures in our calibrated economy. The distribution of tax
revenue over state income predicted by the model turns out to be quite similar to the one
in the data, with a mean of 11.03% and ranging from 7.22% to 16.14%. The distribution
of income tax rates is also similar to the one in the data, although the model predicts a
somewhat larger dispersion.
Let us now turn to the cross-section of policies predicted by the model. We ￿nd a
signi￿cant positive relation between tax revenue over state income and the fraction of skilled
workers among the residents in the state, as ￿gure 14 illustrates. This ￿gure is a bit surprising
given that in our model taxation is only used as a means to redistribute income and that the
skill premium is the only source of income inequality. We note that calibrated technologies
di⁄er across regions and that there is a tax base e⁄ect. For a given individual tax, states
with a higher fraction of skilled (rich) workers obtain a higher total tax revenue.
The data also displays the same pattern, as shown by ￿gure 15. The model is able to
predict the high taxes of states like New York, Connecticut, or Massachusetts.
Let us now compare the cross-sectional implications of the model regarding average in-
come tax rates (on skilled workers) to the data. In the model, states with a higher skill
fraction in equilibrium have lower tax rates, as can be seen in ￿gure 16. Figure 17 illustrates
that there is no signi￿cant relationship between income tax rates and skill fractions in the
data.
27We note that this is the total income tax rate, including state and federal tax. We use NBER￿ s TAXSIM
code to compute state income taxes. See the appendix for details.
28Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming havo no state income tax.
In addition, New Hampshire and Tennessee only tax capital income.
237.3.2 Redistributive transfers
Next, we compute the cross-section of equilibrium redistributive transfers across all regions.
We base our comparison with the data on the size of redistributive transfers per recipient,
a variable that can be measured directly. Following Meyer (2000), we de￿ne transfers per
recipient as the sum of the payments in year 2000 of the two main welfare bene￿ts (Food
Stamps and Temporary Aid for Needy Families). These are largely decided at the state level.
The appendix contains further details on these variables.
As can be seen in table 3a, the average transfer is $6,099, and ranges from $3,879 (Al-
abama, South Carolina) to $11,877 (Alaska and California). In comparison, the model
predicts an average transfer of $8,686, somewhat larger than the average in the data.
Next, we compare the cross-sections of transfers per recipient in the data and the model.
The model predicts that states with a higher fraction of skilled residents will implement a
larger transfer per recipient, as can be seen in ￿gure 18. The data also features a signi￿cant
positive relationship between redistributive transfers per recipient and the skilled fraction
among the residents in the state, as shown in ￿gure 19.29
8 Worker mobility and redistribution policies
Has interstate migration led to convergence in redistributive policies? To address this ques-
tion we use our model to compute redistribution policies in autarky (no mobility). For this
we use the geographical distribution of workers by state of birth. We then use the model
to compute redistribution policies using the geographical distribution of workers by state of
residence in the data.30 The state-speci￿c technology parameters are the same in the two
scenarios.31 We then compare the two cross-sections of redistributive policies.
Our results indicate that worker mobility has had virtually no impact on redistributive
transfers, while it has induced considerable convergence in tax rates. Figures 20 and 21
illustrate this ￿nding. Autarky income tax rates are on the horizontal axis of ￿gure 20,
and equilibrium tax rates on the vertical axis. Clearly, the states that would have had the
29Di⁄erences in the size of transfers in the data still remain if we control for regional di⁄erences in price
levels. O¢ cial estimates of the price level by state are hard to come by. We use the ACCRA cost of living
index (http://www.coli.org/) produced for the main cities in the US to construct an approximation to state-
level price indeces. The correlation coe¢ cient between the unadjusted cross-section of transfers and the
price-adjusted one is 0.98. We thank Daniele Coen-Pirani for sharing his data with us.
30As shown in the previous section the equilibrium cross-section for the fraction of skilled residents is very
close to the cross-section in the data.
31We note that these parameters were calibrated using the geographical distribution of workers by state
of residence, together with data on the skill premium and worker productivity.
24highest tax rates in autarky also display the highest tax rates under mobility. However,
their tax rate is substantially lower in the equilibrium with mobility. Analogously, tax rates
under worker mobility are higher than in autarky for states with the lowest autarky tax
rates. Overall, interstate worker migration has generated substantial convergence in tax
rates. Table 4 compares the two distributions. While in autarky tax rates range from 0.12
to 0.37, under mobility the range is 0.19-0.34. The mean tax rate is practically unchanged,
at 0.26, suggesting that worker mobility did not introduce downward pressure on tax rates.
Similarly, ￿gure 23 compares the cross-sections of transfers per recipient with and with-
out worker mobility. Our results clearly suggest that interstate worker migration has had
virtually no e⁄ect on this measure of redistributive transfers; the equilibrium values are al-
most on the 45 degree line. This ￿nding suggests that the often-voiced concerns that worker
mobility triggers to a "race to the bottom" in income redistribution policies seem misplaced.
The intuition behind our ￿nding is the following. First of all, we note that migration
￿ ows have induced a large skill fraction gain in states that, in autarky, would have had the
highest tax rates. Figure 22 illustrates this point. Virginia and Georgia are the two states
with the highest autarky tax rates and, at the same time, their skill fraction has increased
by more than ￿ve percentage points. Conversely, North Dakota and Iowa feature the lowest
autarky tax rates and have su⁄ered a skill loss of the same magnitude. Figures 23 and 24
show that states with high autarky tax rates are characterized by high autarky skill premia
arising from skill-scarce labor endowments.
We point out that the reason behind the large skill fraction gain in the states that have
experienced gains in skill fraction lies in their high labor productivity parameters (equilibrium
utility). To illustrate this point, consider the two states with the largest gain in skill fraction
(Virginia and Georgia) and the two states with the largest loss (North Dakota and Iowa)
in ￿gure 22.32 Table 2 reports the classi￿cation of all states by utility (labor productivity)
deciles. As expected, labor productivity is very low in North Dakota and Iowa, while very
high in Georgia, and Virginia. Respectively, they fall in deciles 1, 2, 8, and 9. As we saw
earlier, regions with high labor productivity attract both types of workers. Since skilled
workers are more geographically mobile, regions that have enjoyed net in￿ ows of workers
have also experienced an increase in their skill fraction.33
As a result of the gain in skill fraction, these high productivity states have experienced
reductions in their skill premium and, hence, less of a need for tax-based redistribution,
relative to autarky. The reduction in tax rates did not lead to lower transfers (per recipient)
because of the larger tax base; a higher skill fraction is a higher number of relatively rich
32Maryland had a skill fraction gain almost as large as Virginia. We do not think it is a representative
case because of its proximity to DC. In any case, its relative labor productivity is very high too.
33Recall that the changes in state-level skill composition are the result of worker relocation, not of general
changes in skill composition at the national level.
25workers.
Let us examine more in detail why transfers per recipient appear insensitive to changes in
skill composition at the state level. It is straightforward to see that the changes in transfers
are bound to be smaller than the changes in taxes. The budget constraint of the regional
government implies that for a given income tax ￿, the transfer handed out to the unskilled
in the region has to be ￿￿. As a result, states experiencing an increase in ￿ will have both
a larger tax base and a lower skill premium. The resulting lower wage inequality leads to
a lower redistributive tax. The size of the transfer, ￿￿, will fall by less than the tax and
might even increase. The net e⁄ect depends on parameter values. In our calibration, the two
e⁄ects almost balance out. In response to an increase in skill fraction, the ￿scal authority
chooses to hold the size of the transfer practically constant and to reduce the tax on skilled
workers.34
It is worth pointing out that ￿gure 22 is completely at odds with the race to the bottom
logic. In this ￿gure, states with high autarky tax rates, mainly due to low relative endow-
ments of skilled labor, have disproportionately gained skilled workers. Worker migration in
our calibrated model has been driven by regional labor productivity di⁄erences. For instance,
the large labor productivity of Virginia and Georgia relative to the skill fraction of its labor
endowments has been the main factor behind the large net gains in skilled workers.
9 Conclusions
The goal of this paper was to study the e⁄ect of worker mobility on redistributive policies in
US states. We have presented a model where both redistribution policy and labor ￿ ows are
endogenous. We ￿nd that the calibrated model reproduces some key qualitative facts about
net migration ￿ ows and redistribution policy. Our main ￿nding is that worker mobility has
induced substantial convergence, but no downward pressure, in tax rates. At the same time
we ￿nd that transfers per recipient are virtually una⁄ected.
Our analysis makes clear that di⁄erences in labor productivity are the key determinant of
income, labor ￿ ows, and transfers per recipient. The large regional di⁄erences in productivity
observed in the data appear to be much more important in determining net migration ￿ ows
than redistributive policies. Consequently, the future of national welfare states in Europe
will crucially depend on the evolution of labor productivity in the member states.
Naturally, our results beg the question of what are the sources behind regional di⁄er-
ences in labor productivity and what drives their evolution over time. Hendricks (2004)
has proposed an explanation based on agglomeration economies in human capital. In the
34We also note that di⁄erences in the size of the transfer across states also re￿ ect regional di⁄erences in
labor productivity.
26light of our results, this explanation is not suitable for the case of US states. We ￿nd that
some states were extremely successful in attracting workers from other states despite having
very poor skill endowments.35 And, conversely, some of the states with the most skilled en-
dowments displayed very low in-migration rates.36 Clearly, more work is needed to account
satisfactorily for regional di⁄erences in labor productivity.
35Arizona, Georgia and Virginia experienced very large gains in skill fraction due to interstate migration,
as illustrated by ￿gure 27. The skill fraction of their state-born populations was, respectively, 0.20, 0.21,
and 0.25, as reported in table 1. The mean value across all states was 0.26.
36North Dakota, Iowa, Wisconsin, and New York su⁄ered a reduction in the skill fraction of their popula-
tions as a result of interstate migration. The skill fractions of their state-born populations were, respectively,
0.32, 0.30, 0.29, and 0.35, that is, well above the average of 0.26.
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Proposition 5 follows from simple manipulation of the ￿rst order conditions associated with
problem (SBP). The key step is to show they are necessary and su¢ cient.
Proposition 11 The ￿rst order conditions associated with problem (SBP) are necessary and
su¢ cient to characterize the second best allocations.
Proof. The ￿rst order conditions of problem (SBP) are
(1 ￿ ￿)Uc(c1;l1) = ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)Ul(c1;l1) = ￿￿F1(l1;￿l2)
(￿ + ￿)Uc(c2;l2) = ￿￿
(￿ + ￿)Ul(c2;l2) = ￿￿￿F2(l1;￿l2)
￿[c1 + ￿c2 ￿ F (l1;￿l2)] = 0
￿[U(c2;l2) ￿ U(c1;l1)] = 0
for ￿ ￿ 0 and ￿ ￿ 0.
Consider the alternative program
max
u1;u2;xu1 + ￿u2 (5)
subject to
u1 ￿ u2;
u1 ￿ U (x1);
u2 ￿ U (x2);
c1 + ￿c2 ￿ F (l1;￿l2):
We show that an allocation x is second best if and only if there exists u1 and u2 such that
fu1;u2;xg solve (5). If any solution fu1;u2;xg to (5) satis￿es u1 = U (x1) and u2 = U (x2),
our claim follows trivially. Assume that x solves (5) but u1 < U(c1;l1) and u2 = U(c2;l2)
(obviously u2 < U(c2;l2) will never be a solution). Construct now an alternative allocation
with the same work hours but u1 = U(c0
1;l1), with c0
1 = c1 ￿ ", c0
2 = c2 + "=￿; and u0
2 =
30U (c0
2;l2). Allocation x0 = (c0
1;c0
2;l1;l2) satis￿es (RC) but u2 ￿ U(c2;l2) < u0
2 and u1 ￿ u2 <
u0
2. Clearly, fu1;u0
2;x0g contradicts fu1;u2;xg being a solution to (5).
The program (5) is concave over a convex set, hence the necessary ￿rst order conditions
1 = ￿ + ￿1
￿ = ￿2 ￿ ￿
￿1Uc (x1) = ￿
￿2Uc (x2) = ￿￿
￿￿1Ul (x1) = ￿F1 (l1;￿l2)
￿￿2Ul (x2) = ￿￿F2 (l1;￿l2)
￿[u1 ￿ u2] = 0
￿1 [u1 ￿ U (x1)] = 0
￿2 [u2 ￿ U (x2)] = 0
￿[c1 + ￿c2 ￿ F (l1;￿l2)] = 0
are also su¢ cient for the solution to program (5).
Let x be an allocation satisfying the ￿rst order conditions associated with problem (SBP).
It is straightforward to show that there exist ￿, ￿1, ￿2, ￿, u1 and u2 such that allocation x
also satis￿es the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for (5). Hence x is a solution to (5) and
x is a second best allocation.
It turns out to be convenient to prove ￿rst that the incentive compatibility constraint is
binding under second best allocations and then move to the decentralization result.
Proposition 12 Let ￿ < ￿ ￿. Then for any second best allocation x given ￿, the incentive
compatibility constraint (IC) is binding:
U(c1;l1) = U(c2;l2):




MRSi(ci;li) = Fi (l1;￿l2) for i = 1;2;
where MRSi = v0(li)=u0 (ci). Hence c1 = c2. If l2 > l1, the incentive compatibility constraint













31as skilled labor is the scarce factor. First order conditions imply then v0 (l1) < v0 (l2) but
this contradicts l1 ￿ l2:
Equipped with Propositions 11 and 12, we can characterize the second best allocation
with four equations. The ￿rst order conditions associated with problem (SBP) yield that
the labor supply is not being distorted, that is,
MRSi(ci;li) = Fi (l1;￿l2) for i = 1;2:
Hence, the second best allocations are fully characterized by the marginal rate of substitution
equating the marginal product of each worker, the incentive compatibility constraint (IC)
and the binding resource constraint (RC).37
Proof of Proposition 5. It is straightforward to show that a competitive equilibrium
allocation given ￿ is pinned down by
MRS(c1;l1) = F1 (l1;￿l2);
MRS(c2;l2) = F2 (l1;￿l2);
c1 + ￿c2 = F (l1;￿l2);
c2 = F2 (l2;￿l2)l2 ￿ ￿:
It is clear that the skilled (unskilled) welfare is decreasing (increasing) with ￿. Hence there
is a value of ￿ such that the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) binds. The resulting
competitive equilibrium allocations are second best by Proposition 11 and 12.
Proof of Proposition 6. Proposition 12 has already proved property 1. We start with














The properties of F and ￿ < ￿ ￿, imply l2 > l1. The incentive compatibility constraint





Uc(c1;l1). But then x is incompatible with the necessary ￿rst order conditions
of problem (SBP) since MRS2 > MRS1 implies that F2 > F1, contradicting our initial
hypothesis.
Now we prove the third property. By ￿rst order conditions for second best allocation,
MRS(c2;l2) > MRS(c1;l1). Since U(c1;l1) = U(c2;l2) and indi⁄erence curves are strictly
convex, we have that (c2;l2) >> (c1;l1)
37This only holds for ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.
32Property 4 also follows. Assume ￿ ￿ 0. Because skilled workers are scarce, they will be
strictly better o⁄, contradicting property 1:
Proof of Proposition 7. We ￿rst prove that for any ￿ < ￿ ￿, second best allocations x
satisfy c2 < F2 (l1;￿l2). Consider the set A = f(c;l) : c ￿ F2 (l1;￿l2)(l ￿ l2) + c2g. Since
MRS (c2;l2) = F2 (l1;￿l2) and preferences are strictly concave, for any (c;l) 2 A, U (c;l) ￿
U (c2;l2), with equality sign i⁄ c = c2 and l = l2. Therefore (c1;l1) 62 A since the incentive
compatibility constraint is binding and l1 6= l2 as Proposition 8 indicates. This implies
c1 > c2 + F2 (l1;￿l2)(l1 ￿ l2)
and since F1 (l1;￿l2) < F2 (l1;￿l2),
c1 ￿ F1 (l1;￿l2)l1 > c2 ￿ F2 (l1;￿l2)l2:
Using constant returns to scale, the resource constraint can be written as
(c1 ￿ F1 (l1;￿l2)l1) + ￿ (c2 ￿ F2 (l1;￿l2)l2) = 0
therefore c2 < F2 (l1;￿l2)l2.
We next show that second best allocation x is feasible at ￿0. Note that
F (l1;￿
0l2) ￿ F (l1;￿l2) = F2 (l1;^ ￿l2)l2 (￿
0 ￿ ￿)
where ^ ￿ 2 [￿;￿0] by the Taylor theorem. Using the concavity of F,
F (l1;￿
0l2) ￿ F (l1;￿l2) > F2 (l1;￿
0l2)l2 (￿
0 ￿ ￿):
Since the resource constraint is binding
F (l1;￿





0l2) ￿ c1 ￿ ￿
0c2 > (F2 (l1;￿
0l2)l2 ￿ c2)(￿
0 ￿ ￿):
Since we proved that F2 (l1;￿0l2)l2 ￿ c2 > 0, allocation x satis￿es the resource constraint
with strict inequality sign when ￿0.
By continuity, there exists ^ c2 > c2 such that F (l1;￿0l2) > c1 + ￿0^ c2. It is clear then that
^ x = fc1;^ c2;l1;l2g is feasible and incentive compatible with U (c1;l1)+￿U (c2;l2) < U (c1;l1)+
￿U (^ c2;l2). Since allocations x0 cannot do worse than ^ x, and the incentive constraint is
binding for ￿0, the result follows.
33B Data
1. US Census 2000.
Our data is a 5% sample of the 2000 US Census extracted using IPUMS. We restrict our
analysis to individuals in the age interval 25-45; old enough to have obtained a college but
young enough to avoid migration driven by retirement motives. Individuals with a college
degree are de￿ned as skilled workers.
We characterize the skill distribution of the labor force in each state by sorting our
sample by state of residence in 2000. Clearly, some of these individuals have been born in
the state and some out of state. The latter group contains individuals born in other states
and individuals born outside of the U.S.
We characterize net interstate migration as follows. For each skill type, we de￿ne net
in-migration into a state as the number of residents in that state in year 2000 minus the
number of individuals born in the state. Aghion et al (2005) and Dahl (2005) characterize
net migration ￿ ows in a similar manner. More speci￿cally, we build the labor endowments
of each state by sorting the individuals in our sample by state of birth and assigning to each
of them their educational attainment year 2000.
Clearly, the total number of residents in the US as a whole will be larger than the total
number of US-born individuals due to the large number of foreign￿ born workers living in
the US in year 2000. As a result, practically all US states have experienced a net in￿ ow of
workers of both types.38
To enhance comparability of skill premia across states, we estimate state-level hourly
wages restricting to a highly homogeneous subsample. In particular, we restrict to white
males, age 25-45, that are part of the workforce.
2. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional accounts.
We compute output per worker by dividing state personal income in year 2001 by total
employment in the state in the same year.
Our measures of tax revenue are also from the BEA. We consider two measures of tax
revenue, both averaged over the period 2000-2002. The ￿rst is total personal current taxes
(federal, state, and local) over state income. This is mainly the income tax. The second is
state (and local) personal current taxes plus property tax, also over state income.
3. NBER￿ s Taxsim.
To compute average income tax rates, for skilled workers, we use NBER￿ s income tax
simulator (Taxsim) to compute the tax that a typical skilled family would have to pay in
each of the US states, keeping family income constant. We then compute the average tax
38It is well known that immigrants are highly concentrated in a few gateway states, such as California,
Texas, Florida, Chicago, and New York. However, there is some evidence of a recent shift in location patterns
of immigrants in the last few years.
34income tax rate of a skilled worker dividing by pre-tax income. In particular, we assume
that a typical family is a two-person household with a joint income of $200,000. The exact
￿gure does not matter much, only the fact that it is kept constant across all states. Leigh
(2005) also uses Taxsim in an interesting application.
4. US Department of Health and Human Services.
Following Meyer (2000), we consider two types of redistributive transfers: Temporary Aid
to Needy Families (TANF) and Food Stamps (FS). States have had considerable autonomy
in deciding the size of TANF and FS transfers particularly since 1996 when Aid for Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) was replaced by TANF.
Using data from the US Department of Health and Human Services, we de￿ne each state￿ s
transfer as the sum of TANF (and similar state programs) and Food Stamps for a family of
3 with no income in each state in year 2000. The average transfer across all states was 6,101
USD per household. The same family would have received 3,879 USD in Alabama, the state
with the lowest transfers. At the other end of the spectrum, this family would have received
11,877 USD in Alaska or 10,278 USD in California, the states with the highest transfers.
35C Region-speci￿c amenities
While our model is able to match several facts on total net ￿ ows, it performs poorly in terms
of bilateral net worker ￿ ows among U.S. states. This is perhaps not surprising given that
the original model was not intended to reproduce bilateral ￿ ows but to explain the impact of
factor mobility into ￿scal policy. We have focused on after-tax income, ignoring many other
determinants of location decisions. In particular, geographical factors were unaccounted
for. In this subsection we brie￿ y document how to extend the model in order to match the
observed bilateral net ￿ ows.
Conceptually, the model needs to be extended along two di⁄erent dimensions. On the
one hand, for a signi￿cant number of pairs of states, both types of workers ￿ ow (in net
terms) from a state with high utility, according to our model, to states with lower utility.
We address this issue by incorporating new determinants of the utility from living in a region
(amenities). On the other hand, the size of bilateral migration ￿ ows varies a lot across pairs
of states. Most likely, this is related to the geographic structure of states. That is, one would
expect states with common borders to generate larger net ￿ ows than states far apart. We
deal with this size issue by generalizing our concept of "migration opportunities".
First, we introduce a region-speci￿c utility factor￿ which we call ￿amenity￿for simplicity.
Now the relevant utility of region r is Ar = ￿rU (cr
i;lr
i). Amenities give us the degree of
freedom necessary to tweak the ranking of regions. The structure of bilateral net ￿ ows
imposed by the world equilibrium is, however, unchanged: workers of both types must ￿ ow
in the same direction and only from lower to higher ranked regions. In terms of the matrix
of net ￿ ows, only its upper triangular component can be captured by the model.
Next, we allow for a non-uniform distribution of ￿migration opportunities￿ : now a fraction
hi (r;r0) of workers of type i = 1;2 born in region r receive an opportunity to move to region
r0, with
P
r02R hi (r;r0) = 1. We need to do so in order to match some particularly large
bilateral ￿ ows￿ usually associated with geographical proximity. The probabilities are type-
speci￿c to capture the heterogeneity in the skill bias of bilateral net ￿ ows.
We proceed as follows. We choose the amenities￿factor ￿r such that the resulting ranking
of regions maximizes total net bilateral ￿ ows captured by the model. For over 80% of the
pairs (by count), skilled and unskilled bilateral net rates share the same sign. These pairs
re￿ ect a much larger percentage of total ￿ ows. Out of these pairs, we ￿nd that we can capture
in excess of 90% of the net bilateral ￿ ows despite having only 49 degrees of freedom to match
1225 bilateral ￿ ows.39 The estimated utilities Ar, jointly with our choice of parameters k1
and k2, determine the ￿acceptance￿probability for each pair (r;r0). We then choose hi (r;r0),
39Structural estimation of interstate migration, as in Dahl (2002), requires pair-speci￿c amenities, e⁄ec-
tively using 1;225 degrees of freedom.
36as well as the actual value of Ar, such that we match exactly the bilateral net ￿ ow rates.
We view both additional features as natural and very successful extensions of the model.
Without adding too much structure, we are able to account for the vast majority of worker
￿ ows. The ranking implied by the amenities corrects for the anomalies observed before.
For example, the states of New York and New Jersey are assigned low amenity values. We
then move to analyze the model cross-state implications for ￿scal policy given the empirical
workforce distribution. Table 2 reports the resulting ranking.
D Accounting for foreign-born workers









for i = 1;2, where we use R = 3 as an illustration. Let fi(r) denote the type-i foreign-born







as the sample means, for i = 1;2.
We treat the foreign-born as if they had been born in the country, spread uniformly









Mi(1;1) + fi(1) Mi(1;2) Mi(1;3)
Mi(2;1) Mi(2;2) + fi(2) Mi(2;3)
Mi(3;1) Mi(3;2) Mi(3;3) + fi(3)
1
A
= Mi + IRfi;
where IR is an identity matrix of dimension R and fi = (fi(1);:::;fi(R))0.
37Let us now de￿ne bilateral gross ￿ ows between each pair of states. Let the gross out-


















s=1 Mi(r;s) + fi
:
Let us now de￿ne net ￿ ows. The net ￿ ows into a state originate either in another state
(in￿ ow of natives) or in the rest of the world (in￿ ow of foreign-born). Respectively,
Ni(r;s) = Mi(r;s) ￿ Mi(s;r)
e Ni(r;s) = Ni(r;s) + (0 ￿ fi(r)) = Ni(r;s) ￿ fi(r):
In matrix form, e Ni = Mi ￿ M0
i ￿ IRfi.
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Table 1 
 
[1] Fraction of skilled in state-born population. [2] Fraction of skilled in state-resident 
population in 2000. [3] Fraction of foreign born living in the state in 2000. [4] Fraction of 
skilled in state-resident population in 2000, excluding foreign-born individuals. [5] Skill 
premium. [6] Output per worker. [7] Probability of out-migration for unskilled workers. [8] 
Probability of out-migration for skilled workers. 
 
Source: 2000 US Census and BEA regional accounts.  
 
 
    [1] [2] [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7] [8] 
State sf_birth  sf_res  fb  sfres_nofb  skp2000  workerprod  p_out_u  p_out_s 
Alabama  0.22 0.21 0.04  0.26  1.78  49430  0.30 0.46 
Alaska  0.23 0.23 0.10  0.29  1.45  68116  0.57 0.79 
Arizona  0.20 0.24 0.20  0.34  1.69  57496  0.37 0.56 
Arkansas  0.20 0.18 0.05  0.22  1.84  45759  0.37 0.50 
California  0.26 0.27 0.39  0.43  1.69  66336  0.32 0.35 
Colorado  0.29 0.34 0.13  0.54  1.61  59796  0.42 0.53 
Connecticut  0.35 0.35 0.15  0.54  1.91  77903  0.36 0.54 
Delaware  0.30 0.28 0.09  0.38  1.64  89223  0.38 0.65 
Florida  0.22 0.24 0.23  0.31  1.82  54528  0.34 0.50 
Georgia  0.21 0.27 0.11  0.36  1.84  61028  0.26 0.41 
Hawaii  0.30 0.28 0.25  0.40  1.40  54382  0.43 0.56 
Idaho  0.24 0.21 0.09  0.28  1.56  45964  0.48 0.66 
Illinois  0.30 0.30 0.18  0.45  1.57  64692  0.36 0.47 
Indiana  0.24 0.22 0.05  0.27  1.52  54210  0.31 0.52 
Iowa  0.30 0.25 0.05  0.33  1.51  48475  0.38 0.61 
Kansas  0.29 0.29 0.09  0.42  1.51  48929  0.46 0.58 
Kentucky  0.20 0.19 0.03  0.23  1.71  50553  0.30 0.48 
Louisiana  0.21 0.20 0.05  0.24  1.60  57098  0.29 0.47 
Maine  0.23 0.24 0.04  0.31  1.76  46559  0.34 0.56 
Maryland  0.27 0.34 0.15  0.48  1.72  61502  0.34 0.53 
Massachusetts  0.36 0.39 0.17  0.63  1.71  68701  0.35 0.45 
Michigan  0.26 0.24 0.07  0.30  1.64  60614  0.27 0.45 
Minnesota  0.31 0.32 0.08  0.46  1.64  56658  0.27 0.42 
Mississippi  0.20 0.18 0.03  0.22  1.50  44723  0.39 0.53 
Missouri  0.27 0.25 0.05  0.33  1.64  52294  0.32 0.50 
Montana  0.28 0.25 0.03  0.33  1.45  39994  0.49 0.65 
Nebraska  0.32 0.28 0.07  0.39  1.60  48860  0.42 0.57 
Nevada  0.22 0.18 0.24  0.24  1.53  60593  0.51 0.66 
New  Hampshire 0.27 0.30 0.06  0.41  1.68  55825  0.38 0.59 
New  jersey  0.35 0.34 0.25  0.51  1.77  75655  0.38 0.52 
New  Mexico  0.22 0.22 0.14  0.30  1.74  52063  0.45 0.64 
New  York  0.35 0.31 0.28  0.47  1.85  75983  0.37 0.52 
North  Carolina  0.22 0.25 0.09  0.33  1.76  58808  0.24 0.40 
North  Dakota  0.32 0.26 0.03  0.34  1.44  41880  0.51 0.68 
Ohio  0.26 0.24 0.04  0.30  1.69  55446  0.29 0.48 
Oklahoma  0.25 0.21 0.07  0.27  1.67  45739  0.35 0.53 
Oregon  0.24 0.26 0.14  0.35  1.60  52932  0.38 0.51 
Pennsylvania  0.30 0.27 0.06  0.35  1.77  58440  0.27 0.49 
Rhode  Island  0.33 0.29 0.16  0.44  1.74  60482  0.40 0.56 
South  Carolina  0.20 0.22 0.05  0.27  1.77  51983  0.28 0.46 
South  Dakota  0.30 0.25 0.03  0.33  1.57  46597  0.49 0.65   53
    [1] [2] [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7] [8] 
State sf_birth  sf_res  fb  sfres_nofb  skp2000  workerprod  p_out_u  p_out_s 
              
Tennessee  0.21 0.22 0.05  0.28  1.82  52108  0.28 0.45 
Texas  0.22 0.24 0.22  0.34  1.81  60812  0.23 0.31 
Utah  0.27 0.26 0.12  0.35  1.47  50592  0.32 0.47 
Vermont  0.26 0.31 0.05  0.43  1.61  45755  0.39 0.65 
Virginia  0.25 0.32 0.13  0.45  1.86  62449  0.34 0.54 
Washington  0.26 0.29 0.16  0.40  1.61  63437  0.33 0.44 
West  Virginia  0.20 0.17 0.02  0.19  1.71  49270  0.44 0.62 
Wisconsin  0.29 0.25 0.05  0.34  1.41  53346  0.24 0.47 
Wyoming  0.26 0.20 0.05  0.25  1.62  57466  0.62 0.79 
                          
min  0.20 0.17 0.02  0.19  1.40  39994.00  0.23 0.31 
mean  0.26 0.26 0.11  0.35  1.66  56429.68  0.37 0.53 
max  0.36 0.39 0.39  0.63  1.91  89223.00  0.62 0.79 
sdev  0.05 0.05 0.08  0.09  0.13 9782.51 0.09 0.10 




[1] Decile by (increasing) equilibrium utility. [2] State. [3] Ranking by utility. [4] Ranking by 




[1] [2]  [3]  [4]  [5] 
utility decile  state  rank_U rank_A [6]=[5]-[4] 
1 Montana  1  25  24 
1 North  Dakota  2  1  -1 
1 Mississippi  3  10  7 
1 Oklahoma  4  36  32 
1 Vermont  5  21  16 
2 Idaho  6  40  34 
2 Arkansas  7  32  25 
2 South  Dakota  8  7  -1 
2 Maine  9  16  7 
2 Iowa  10  6  -4 
3 Kansas  11  22  11 
3 Nebraska  12  15  3 
3 West  Virginia  13  5  -8 
3 Alabama  14  28  14 
3 Utah  15  35  20 
4 Kentucky  16  23  7 
4 South  Carolina  17  37  20 
4 New  Mexico  18  31  13 
4 Missouri  19  26  7 
4 Tennessee  20  38  18 
5 Oregon  21  47  26 
5 Wisconsin  22  17  -5 
5 Indiana  23  13  -10 
5 Hawaii  24  24  0 
5 Florida  25  43  18 
6 Ohio  26  9  -17 
6 New  Hampshire  27  29  2 
6 Minnesota  28  20  -8 
6 Louisiana  29  19  -10 
6 Wyoming  30  27  -3 
7 Arizona  31  49  18 
7 Pennsylvania  32  3  -29 
7 North  Carolina  33  39  6 
7 Colorado  34  44  10 
7 Nevada  35  50  15 
8 Michigan  36  12  -24 
8 Rhode  Island  37  8  -29 
8 Texas  38  41  3 
8 Georgia  39  48  9 
8 Maryland  40  33  -7 
9 Virginia  41  42  1 
9 Washington  42  45  3 
9 Illinois  43  11  -32 
9 California  44  34  -10 
9 Alaska  45  46  1   55
[1] [2]  [3]  [4]  [5] 
utility decile  state  rank_U rank_A [6]=[5]-[4] 
        
10 Massachusetts  46  18  -28 
10 New  jersey  47  4  -43 
10 New  York  48  2  -46 
10 Connecticut  49  14  -35 






Data  mean st.dev.  min.  max. 
Total personal current tax / State Income  0.13  0.02  0.10  0.19 
State and local taxes plus property tax/  State  Income 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.05 
Average income tax rate skilled family  (TAXSIM)  0.27 0.02 0.23 0.30 






Equilibrium  mean st.dev.  min.  max. 
Taxes/State  Income  0.11 0.02 0.07 0.16 
Tax rate on skilled workers  0.26  0.03  0.19  0.34 
Transfer per recipient   $   8,686   $   3,404   $   3,956  $ 19,288 
Autarky             
Tax rate on skilled workers  0.26  0.06  0.12  0.37 




Table 4: Cross-section of tax rates with worker mobility and without (autarky). 
 
   Autarky Mobility 
min 0.1236  0.1921 
mean 0.2576  0.2642 
max 0.3688  0.3375 
range 0.2452  0.1454 
sdev 0.0572  0.0332 
 